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In this paper we introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), an extension of Strategy Logic with
modal operators for individual knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly
and to reason about the knowledge agents have of their own and other agents’ strategies. We provide
a semantics to ESL in terms of epistemic concurrent game models, and consider the corresponding
model checking problem. We show that the complexity of model checking ESL is not worse than
(non-epistemic) Strategy Logic.
1 Introduction
Formal languages to represent and reason about strategies and coalitions are a thriving area of research
in Artificial Intelligence and multi-agent system [4, 8, 19]. Recently, a wealth of multi-modal logics have
appeared, which allow to formalise complex strategic abilities and behaviours of individual agents and
groups [2, 5]. In parallel to these developments, in knowledge representation there is a well-established
tradition of extending logics for reactive systems with epistemic operators to reason about the knowledge
agents have of systems evolution. These investigations began in the ’80s with contributions on combi-
nations of linear- and branching-time temporal logics with multi-agent epistemic languages [9, 10, 6].
Along this line of research, [11] introduced alternating-time temporal epistemic logic (ATEL), an ex-
tension of ATL with modalities for individual knowledge. The various flavours of logics of time and
knowledge have been successfully applied to the specification of distributed and multi-agent systems in
domains as diverse as security protocols, UAVs, web services, and e-commerce, as well as to verification
by model checking [7, 16].
In this paper we take inspiration from the works above and pursue further this line of research by
introducing Epistemic Strategy Logic, an extension of Strategy Logic (SL) [5, 17] that allows agents to
reason about their strategic abilities. The extension here proposed is naive in the sense that it suffers many
of the shortcomings of its relative ATEL [12]. Nonetheless, we reckon that it constitutes an excellent
starting point to analyse the interaction of knowledge and strategic abilities in a language, such as SL,
that explicitly allow for quantification on strategies.
Related Work. This paper builds on previous contributions on Strategy Logic. SL has been intro-
duced in [5] for two-player concurrent game structures (CGS). In [17] the semantics has been extended
to a multi-player setting. Also, [17] introduced bind operators for strategies in the syntax. In the present
contribution we consider multi-agent CGS in line with [17]. However, we adopt an agent-based perspec-
tive and consider agents with possibly different actions and protocols [6]. Also, our language do not
include bind operators to avoid the formal machinery associated with these operators. We leave such an
extension for future and more comprehensive work. Finally, the model checking results in Section 4 are
inspired by and use techniques from [17].
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Even though to our knowledge no epistemic extension of SL has been proposed yet, the interaction
between knowledge and strategic reasoning has been studied extensively, especially in the context of
alternating-time temporal logic. An extension of ATL with knowledge operators, called ATEL, was
put forward in [11], and immediately imperfect information variants of this logic were considered in
[14], which introduces alternating-time temporal observational logic (ATOL) and ATEL-R*, as well as
uniform strategies. Notice that [14] also analyses the distinction between de re and de dicto knowledge
of strategies; this distinction will also be considered later on in the context of Epistemic Strategy Logic.
Further, [13] enriches ATL with a constructive notion of knowledge. As regards (non-epistemic) ATL,
more elaborate notions of strategy have been considered. In [1] commitment in strategies has been
analysed; while [15] introduced a notion of “feasible” strategy. In future work it might be worth exploring
to what extent the theoretical results available for the various flavours of ATEL transfer to ESL.
Scheme of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce the epistemic concurrent game models (ECGM),
which are used in Section 3 to provide a semantics to Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL). In Section 4 we
consider the model checking problem for this setting and state the corresponding complexity results.
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the results and point to future research. For reasons of space, all proofs
are omitted. An extended version of this paper with complete proofs is available [3].
2 Epistemic Concurrent Game Models
In this section we present the epistemic concurrent game models (ECGM), an extension of concurrent
game structures [2, 11], starting with the notion of agent.
Definition 1 (Agent) An agent is a tuple i= 〈Li,Acti,Pri〉 such that (i) Li is the set of local states li, l′i , . . .;
(ii) Acti is the finite set of actions σi,σ ′i , . . .; and (iii) Pri : Li 7→ 2Acti is the protocol function.
Intuitively, each agent i is situated in some local state li ∈ Li, representing her local information, and
performs the actions in Acti according to the protocol function Pri [6]. Differently from [17], we assume
that agents have possibly different actions and protocols. To formally describe the interactions between
agents, we introduce their synchronous composition. Given a set AP of atomic propositions and a set
Ag = {i0, . . . , in} of agents, we define the set L of global states s,s′, . . . (resp. the set Act of joint actions
σ ,σ ′, . . .) as the cartesian product L0× . . .×Ln (resp. Act0× . . .×Actn). In what follows we denote the
jth component of a tuple t as t j or, equivalently, as t( j).
Definition 2 (ECGM) Given a set Ag= {i0, . . . , in} of agents i= 〈Li,Acti,Pri〉, an epistemic concurrent
game model is a tupleP = 〈Ag,s0,τ,pi〉 such that (i) s0 ∈ L is the initial global state; (ii) τ : L×Act 7→ L
is the global transition function, where τ(s,σ) is defined iff σi ∈ Pri(li) for every i ∈ Ag; and (iii) pi :
AP 7→ 2L is the interpretation function for atomic propositions in AP.
The transition function τ describes the evolution of the ECGM from the initial state s0. We now
introduce some notation that will be used in the rest of the paper. The transition relation → on global
states is defined as s→ s′ iff there exists σ ∈ Act s.t. τ(s,σ) = s′. A run λ from a state s, or s-run,
is an infinite sequence s0 → s1 → . . ., where s0 = s. For n,m ∈ N, with n ≤ m, we define λ (n) = sn
and λ [n,m] = sn,sn+1, . . . ,sm. A state s′ is reachable from s if there exists an s-run λ s.t. λ (i) = s′
for some i ≥ 0. We define S as the set of states reachable from the initial state s0. Further, let ] be a
placeholder for arbitrary individual actions. Given a subset A⊆ Ag of agents, an A-action σA is an |Ag|-
tuple s.t. (i) σA(i) ∈ Acti for i ∈ A, and (ii) σA( j) = ] for j /∈ A. Then, ActA is the set of all A-actions and
DA(s) = {σA ∈ ActA | for every i ∈ A,σi ∈ Pri(li)} is the set of all A-actions enabled at s = 〈l0, . . . , ln〉. A
joint action σ extends an A-action σA, or σA v σ , iff σA(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ A. The outcome out(s,σA)
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of action σA at state s is the set of all states s′ s.t. there exists a joint action σ w σA and τ(s,σ) = s′.
Finally, two global states s = 〈l0, . . . , ln〉 and s′ = 〈l′0, . . . , l′n〉 are indistinguishable for agent i, or s ∼i s′,
iff li = l′i [6].
3 Epistemic Strategy Logic
We now introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic as a specification language for ECGM. Hereafter we con-
sider a set Vari of strategy variables xi,x′i, . . ., for every agent i ∈ Ag.
Definition 3 (ESL) For p∈ AP, i∈ Ag and xi ∈Vari, the ESL formulas φ are defined in BNF as follows:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ → φ | Xφ | φUφ | Kiφ | ∃xiφ
The language ESL is an extension of the Strategy Logic in [5] to a multi-agent setting, including
an epistemic operator Ki for each i ∈ Ag. Alternatively, ESL can be seen as the epistemic extension
of the Strategy Logic in [17], minus the bind operator. We do not consider bind operators in ESL for
ease of presentation. The ESL formula ∃xiφ is read as “agent i has some strategy to achieve φ”. The
interpretation of LTL operators X and U is standard. The epistemic formula Kiφ intuitively means that
“agent i knows φ”. The other propositional connectives and LTL operators, as well as the strategy
operator ∀, can be defined as standard. Also, notice that we can introduce the nested-goal fragment
ESL[NG], the boolean-goal fragment ESL[BG], and the one-goal fragment ESL[1G] in analogy to SL
[17]. Further, the free variables fr(φ)⊆ Ag of an ESL formula φ are inductively defined as follows:
fr(p) = /0
fr(¬φ) = fr(Kiφ) = fr(φ)
fr(φ → φ ′) = fr(φ)∪ fr(φ ′)
fr(Xφ) = fr(φUφ ′) = Ag
fr(∃xiφ) = fr(φ)\{i}
A sentence is a formula φ with fr(φ) = /0, and the set bnd(φ) of bound variables is defined as Ag\ fr(φ).
To provide a semantics to ESL formulas in terms of ECGM, we introduce the notion of strategy.
Definition 4 (Strategy) Let γ be an ordinal s.t. 1 ≤ γ ≤ ω and A ⊆ Ag a set of agents. A γ-recall
A-strategy is a function FA[γ] :
⋃
1≤n<1+γ Sn 7→
⋃
s∈S DA(s) s.t. FA[γ](κ) ∈ DA(last(κ)) for every κ ∈⋃
1≤n<1+γ Sn, where 1+ γ = γ for γ = ω and last(κ) is the last element of κ .
Hence, a γ-recall A-strategy returns an enabled A-action for every sequence κ ∈ ⋃1≤n<1+γ Sn of
states of length at most γ . Notice that for A = {i}, FA[γ] can be seen as a function from ⋃1≤n<1+γ Sn
to Acti s.t. FA[γ](κ) ∈ Pri(last(κ)) for κ ∈ ⋃1≤n<1+γ Sn. In what follows we write Fi[γ] for F{i}[γ].
Then, for A = {i0, . . . , im} ⊆ Ag, FA[γ] is equal to Fi0 [γ]× . . .×Fim [γ], where for every κ ∈
⋃
1≤n<1+γ Sn,
(Fi0 [γ]× . . .×Fim [γ])(κ) is defined as the set of actions σ ∈
⋃
s∈S DA(s) s.t. σi = Fi[γ](κ) if i ∈ A, σi = ]
otherwise. Therefore, a group strategy is the composition of its members’ strategies. Further, the outcome
of strategy FA[γ] at state s, or out(s,FA[γ]), is the set of all s-runs λ s.t. λ (i+1) ∈ out(λ (i),F [γ](λ [ j, i]))
for all i≥ 0 and j =max(i−γ+1,0). Depending on γ we can define positional strategies, strategies with
perfect recall, etc. [8]. However, these different choices do not affect the following results, so we assume
that γ is fixed and omit it. Moreover, by Def. 4 it is apparent that agents have perfect information, as
their strategies are determined by global states [4]; we leave contexts of imperfect information for future
research.
Now let χ be an assignment that maps each agent i ∈ Ag to an i-strategy Fi. For Ag = {i0, . . . , in}, we
denote χ(i0)× . . .× χ(in) as Fχ , that is, the Ag-strategy s.t. for every κ ∈ ⋃1≤n<1+γ Sn, Fχ(κ) = σ ∈
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⋃
s∈S DAg(s) iff σi = χ(i)(κ) for every i ∈ Ag. Since |out(s,Fχ)| = 1, we simply write λ = out(s,Fχ).
Also, χ iFi denotes the assignment s.t. (i) for all agents j different from i, χ
i
Fi( j) = χ( j), and (ii) χ
i
Fi(i) =Fi.
Definition 5 (Semantics of ESL) We define whether an ECGM P satisfies a formula ϕ at state s ac-
cording to assignment χ , or (P,s,χ) |=ϕ , as follows (clauses for propositional connectives are straight-
forward and thus omitted):
(P,s,χ) |= p iff s ∈ pi(p)
(P,s,χ) |= Xψ iff for λ = out(s,Fχ), (P,λ (1),χ) |= ψ
(P,s,χ) |= ψUψ ′ iff for λ = out(s,Fχ) there is k ≥ 0 s.t. (P,λ (k),χ) |= ψ ′
and 0≤ j < k implies (P,λ ( j),χ) |= ψ
(P,s,χ) |= Kiψ iff for all s ∈ S, s∼i s′ implies (P,s′,χ) |= ψ
(P,s,χ) |= ∃xiψ iff there exists an i-strategy Fi s.t. (P,s,χ iFi) |= ψ
An ESL formula ϕ is satisfied at state s, or (P,s) |= ϕ , if (P,s,χ) |= ϕ for all assignments χ; ϕ is true
inP , orP |= ϕ , if (P,s0) |= ϕ . The satisfaction of formulas is independent from bound variables, that
is, χ(fr(φ)) = χ ′(fr(φ)) implies that (P,s,χ) |= φ iff (P,s,χ ′) |= φ . In particular, the satisfaction of
sentences is independent from assignments.
We can now state the model checking problem for ESL.
Definition 6 (Model Checking Problem) Given an ECGMP and an ESL formula φ , determine whether
there exists an assignment χ s.t. (P,s0,χ) |= φ .
Notice that, if y1, . . . ,ym is an enumeration of fr(φ), then the model checking problem amounts to
check whetherP |= ∃y1, . . . ,∃ymφ , where ∃y1, . . . ,∃ymφ is a sentence.
Hereafter we illustrate the formal machinery introduced thus far with a toy example.
Example. We introduce a turn-based ECGM with two agents, A and B. First, A secretly chooses
between 0 and 1. Then, at the successive stage, B also chooses between 0 and 1. The game is won
by agent A if the values provided by the two agents coincide, otherwise B wins. We formally de-
scribe this toy game starting with agents A and B. Specifically, A is the tuple 〈LA,ActA,PrA〉, where
(i) LA = {εA,0,1}; (ii) ActA = {set(0),set(1),skip}; and (iii) PrA(εA) = {set(0),set(1)} and PrA(0) =
PrA(1) = {skip}. Further, agent B is defined as the tuple 〈LB,ActB,PrB〉, where LB = {εB,λ ,0,1}; ActB =
{wait,set(0),set(1),skip}; PrB(εB) = {wait}, PrB(λ ) = {set(0),set(1)} and PrB(0) = PrB(1) = {skip}.
The intuitive meaning of local states, actions and protocol functions is clear. Also, we consider the set
AP = {winA,winB} of atomic propositions, which intuitively express that agent A (resp. B) has won the
game. We now introduce the ECGMQ, corresponding to our toy game, as the tuple 〈Ag,s0,τ,pi〉, where
(i) s0 = (εA,εB); (ii) the transition function τ is given as follows for i, j ∈ {0,1}:
• τ((εA,εB),(set(i),wait)) = (i,λ )
• τ((i,λ ),(skip,set( j))) = (i, j)
• τ((i, j),(skip,skip)) = (εA,εB)
and (iii) pi(winA) = {(0,0),(1,1)}, pi(winB) = {(1,0),(0,1)}. Notice that we suppose that our toy game,
represented in Fig. 1, is non-terminating.
Now, we check whether the following ESL specifications hold in the ECGMQ.
Q |= ∀xA X KB ∃yB X winB (1)
Q 6|= ∀xA X ∃yB KB X winB (2)
Q |= ∀xA X KB KA ∃yB X winA (3)
Q |= ∀xA X KB ∃yB KA X winA (4)
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(εA,εB)
s0
(0,λ )s0λ (1,λ ) s1λ
(0,0)s00 (0,1) s01 (1,0)s10 (1,1) s11
(set(0),wait) (set(1),wait)
(skip,set(0)) (skip,set(1)) (skip,set(0)) (skip,set(1))
B
Figure 1: the ECGMQ. Transitions from s00, s01, s10, and s11 to s0 are omitted.
Intuitively, (1) expresses the fact that at the beginning of the game, independently from agent A’s
move, at the next step agent B knows that there exists a move by which she can enforce her victory. That
is, if agent A chose 0 (resp. 1), then B can choose 1 (resp. 0). However, B only knows that there exists
a move, but she is not able to point it out. In fact, (2) does not hold, as B does not know which specific
move A chose, so she is not capable of distinguishing states s0λ and s1λ . Moreover, by (3) B knows that
A knows that there exists a move by which B can let A win. Also, by (4) this move is known to A, as it is
the B-move matching A’s move.
Indeed, in ESL it is possible to express the difference between de re and de dicto knowledge of
strategies. One of the first contributions to tackle this issue formally is [14]. Formula (1) expresses agent
B’s de dicto knowledge of strategy yB; while (2) asserts de re knowledge of the same strategy. Similarly,
in (3) agent A has de re knowledge of strategy yB; while (4) states that agent A knows the same strategy
de dicto. The de re/de dicto distinction is of utmost importance as, as shown above, having a de dicto
knowledge of a strategy does not guarantee that an agent is actually capable of performing the associated
sequence of actions. Ideally, in order to have an effective strategy, agents must know it de re.
4 Model Checking ESL
In this section we consider the complexity of the model checking problem for ESL. In Section 4.1 and 4.2
we provide the lower and upper bound respectively. For reasons of space, we do not provide full proofs,
but only give the most important partial results. We refer to [3] for detailed definitions and complete
proofs.
For an ESL formula φ we define alt(φ) as the maximum number of alternations of quantifiers ∃ and
∀ in φ . Then, ESL[k-alt] is the set of ESL formulas φ with alt(φ) equal to or less than k.
4.1 Lower Bound
In this section we prove that model checking ESL formulas is non-elementary-hard. Specifically, we
show that for ESL formulas with maximum alternation k the model checking problem is k-EXPSPACE-
hard. The proof strategy is similar to [17], namely, we reduce the satisfiability problem for quantified
propositional temporal logic (QPTL) to ESL model checking. However, the reduction applied is differ-
ent, as ESL does not contain the bind operator used in [17].
We first state that the satisfiability problem for QPTL sentences built on a finite set AP= {p0, . . . , pn}
of atomic propositions can be reduced to model checking ESL sentences on a ECGMQ of fixed size on
|AP|, albeit exponential.
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Lemma 1 (QPTL Reduction) Let AP= {p0, . . . , pn} be a finite set of atomic propositions. There exists
an ECGM Q on AP s.t. for every QPTL[k-alt] sentence φ on AP, there exists an ESL[k-alt] sentence φ
s.t. φ is satisfiable iffQ |= φ .
By this result and the fact that the satisfiability problem for QPTL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-hard [17],
we can derive the lower bound for model checking ESL[k-alt].
Theorem 2 (Hardness) The model checking problem for ESL[k-alt] is k-EXPSPACE-hard.
In particular, it follows that ESL model checking is non-elementary-hard.
4.2 Upper Bound
In this section we extend to Epistemic Strategy Logic the model checking procedure for SL in [17],
which is based on alternating tree automata (ATA) [18]. We state the following result, which extends
Lemma 5.6 in [17].
Lemma 3 LetP be an ECGM and φ an ESL formula. Then, there exists an alternating tree automaton
A φP s.t. for every state s ∈ S and assignment χ , we have that (P,s,χ) |= φ iff the assignment-state
encoding T χs belongs to the languageL (A
φ
P).
The following result corresponds to Theorem 5.4 in [17].
Theorem 4 (ATA Direction Projection) Let A φP be the ATA in Lemma 3, and s ∈ S a distinguished
state. Then, there exists a non-deterministic ATA N φP,s s.t. for all Actfr(φ)-labelled ∆-tree T = 〈T,V 〉,
we have that T ∈ L (N φP,s) iff T ′ ∈ L (A φP), where T ′ is the (Actfr(φ)× S)-labelled ∆-tree 〈T,V ′〉
s.t. V ′(x) = (V (x), last(κs·x)).
Then, by using Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 we can state the following result.
Theorem 5 Let P be an ECGM, s a state in P , χ an assignment, and φ an ESL formula. The non-
deterministic ATAN φP,s in Theorem 4 is such that (P,s,χ) |= φ iffL (N φP,s) 6= /0.
We can finally state the following extension to Theorem 5.8 in [17], which follows from the fact that
the non-emptyness problem for alternating tree automata is non-elementary in the size of the formula.
Theorem 6 (Completeness) The model checking problem for ESL is PTIME-complete w.r.t. the size of
the model and NON-ELEMENTARYTIME w.r.t. the size of the formula.
We remark that Theorem 6 can be used to show that the model checking problem for the nested-
goal fragment ESL[NG] is PTIME-complete w.r.t. the size of the model and (k+1)-EXPTIME w.r.t. the
maximum alternation k of a formula. We conclude that the complexity of model checking ESL is not
worse than the corresponding problem for the Strategy Logic in [17].
5 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced Epistemic Strategy Logic, an extension of Strategy Logic [17] with modal-
ities for individual knowledge. We provided this specification language with a semantics in terms of
epistemic concurrent game models (ECGM), and analysed the corresponding model checking problem.
A number of developments for the proposed framework are possible. Firstly, the model checking prob-
lem for the nested-goal, boolean-goal, and one-goal fragment of SL has lower complexity. It is likely
that similar results hold also for the corresponding fragments of ESL. Secondly, we can extend ESL with
modalities for group knowledge, such as common and distributed knowledge. Thirdly, we can consider
various assumptions on ECGM, for instance perfect recall, no learning, and synchronicity. The latter two
extensions, while enhancing the expressive power of the logic, are also likely to increase the complexity
of the model checking and satisfiability problems.
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